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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reports the empirical results of a questionnaire survey about corporate 
dividend policy addressed to finance directors of UK and Portuguese listed firms. 
Similar to other studies (for example, Brav et al., 2005 in the US and Dhanani, 2005 
in the UK),  we survey 313 finance f«directors in the UK and 48 in Portugal to 
examine their views of and understanding about the dividend decision in order to 
compare practice with theoretical propositions to be found in the literature. Our 
survey results demonstrate similarities in the responses from the UK and Portugal, but 
also substantive differences, particularly in respect of the interaction between 
dividend and investment decisions and views about the signalling consequences of 
dividends. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper reports the empirical results of a questionnaire survey about corporate 
dividend policy addressed to finance directors of UK and Portuguese listed firms. 
Similar to other studies, (for example, Brav et al., 2005 in the US and Dhanani, 2005 
in the UK), we survey 313 finance directors in the UK and 48 in Portugal to examine 
their views of and understanding about the dividend decision in order to compare 
practice with theoretical propositions to be found in the literature. But in addition, we 
use this cross-country study to investigate whether corporate views about the dividend 
decision are country dependent. We know of only one other study that compares 
dividend policy in two countries (Norway and the US by Baker et al., 2005). The 
comparison between the UK and Portugal is of interest because they differ in terms of 
size, economic development and structure, and also in terms of the scale and 
sophistication of their respective capital markets. The study reported represents the 
initial findings from a larger, ongoing, pan-European study. 
The corporate finance literature contains a conundrum known to its readers as the 
‘dividend puzzle’ (Black, 1976). Summarising what finance academics understood 
about corporate dividend policy at the time, Fisher Black posed the well-known 
question and answer: “What should corporations do about dividend policy? We don’t 
know!” (Black, 1976:5). Despite three decades of theorising and empirical research 
since then, Black’s observation seems as germane today as it was in 1976. For 
example, Brealey and Myers (2003) in their widely used corporate finance textbook 
observe that, despite the abundance of academic research, we still face a ‘dividend 
controversy’ which they identify as one of the ten ‘unsolved problems in finance’ 
(Brealey and Myers, 2003: 1001-2). That controversy or puzzle stems from the 
seminal contribution of Miller and Modigliani (1961) and their demonstration that in a 
world of perfect markets, the pattern of dividend payments should not matter. The fact 
that they seem to, even in a world where tax regimes discriminate against dividends, 
clearly warrants further empirical investigation. The purpose of this study is to make a 
modest investigative contribution. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section presents a brief 
summary of the major theoretical positions and explanations for dividends and 
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dividend policy that have been advanced in the literature. Section three provides a 
brief review of relevant strands of the empirical literature. Section four explains the 
research methods adopted, followed by a section that deals with the data sample. 
Section six presents the results and the final section summarises and concludes. 
2. Review of Theoretical Literature 
As is well known, the dividend puzzle consists of two elements. First, the apparent 
necessity perceived by (some) corporate executives to pay dividends and their 
occasional willingness to do so, even in the face of financial fragility. The second 
aspect of the puzzle is the apparent eagerness of (some) investors to receive dividend 
payments, even when such payments give rise to an additional tax liability. 
The corporate finance literature offers a variety of explanations for dividends and the 
puzzle that they present. In essence, three fundamental positions can be found in the 
literature with respect to dividends. The first of these, the so-called ‘bird-in-the-hand’ 
hypothesis (Gordon and Shapiro, 1956)1 posits that dividends can increase firm value 
by reducing the risk perceived by investor in corporate cash flows. It holds that, other 
things equal, if two firms, A and B, are identical in all respects save that firm A pays a 
dividend with expectations of future dividend growth, then A will have a higher share 
price. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there is the position that suggests that in the face of 
market imperfections such as transaction costs and taxes, dividends can have negative 
consequences for shareholder wealth. Advocates of this position argue that if the 
income tax rate is greater than the rate of capital gains tax, then dividend payments 
are economically irrational. Similarly, if a firm pays a dividend, but then raises equity 
finance to fund investment the consequent flotation expenses represent an 
unnecessary reduction in shareholder wealth. 
This second position builds on a third, which is the famous dividend irrelevance 
proposition presented by Miller and Modigliani (1961). Given conditions for a perfect 
capital market, dividends become a residual cash flow to shareholders after 
                                          
1 Frankfurter et al. (2002) recount correspondence with Gordon wherein he denies ever having used the 
term bird-in-the-hand, even though he is the person most associated with its use. Nevertheless, Gordon 
acknowledges that the term provides a reasonably accurate representation of his views. 
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investment decisions have been taken. If a firm decides to reinvest all its net cash 
flows and forego a dividend, then shareholders who need income for consumption 
purposes can use the capital market to manufacture ‘home-made’ dividends in the 
short term. In the longer term they will benefit from the increased net present value 
created by the firm’s capital investment.  
In addition to these three fundamental positions, the literature has provided two 
further mainstream developments, the application of principal-agent theory and the 
signalling hypothesis. The agency explanation suggests that the role of dividends is to 
ensure that managers ‘disgorge’ free cash flow (defined as cash flow in excess of that 
required for all positive NPV projects) rather than waste it on unprofitable investment 
and managerial slack, (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Whilst agency theory might 
help to explain how the presence of dividends might alleviate potential agency 
problems, it does not offer an explanation for the remarkably stable pattern of 
dividends that many firms pursue. In certain circumstances an agency perspective 
could be consistent with any of the three fundamental positions outlined above. 
Therefore agency theory might well make a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of the dividend phenomenon, but it does not provide a complete 
explanation, although in fairness none of its advocates make that claim for it. 
The signalling explanation for dividends is based on the idea that financial reports and 
press releases are easier to manipulate than cash flows. Although financial reports 
might show good historical and current earnings performance and managers might 
claim that future prospects are good, investors place more weight on management 
actions. If managers are truly confident about future performance then they can best 
signal this by maintaining and indeed increasing the dividend payout – the signalling 
hypothesis focuses on the changes in dividends, rather than levels. There is a 
substantial amount of empirical support for the signalling effect. For example, 
empirical studies show that firms tend to increase dividends only after sustained 
increases in earnings (Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler, 1997) and that the initiation of 
dividend payments is read as a positive signal of future prospects by investors (Healy 
and Palepu, 1988).  
In addition to these mainstreampositions, other explanations have been proffered in 
alternative fields of inquiry such as behavioural finance. For example, Frankfurter et 
al. summarise some of this research as follows: 
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“… the dividend payment is a ritual meant to strengthen the bond between the 
owners and the stewards of the firm, a reinforcement necessary because of the 
separation of ownership from management.” (Frankfurter et al., 2002: 203). 
3. Review of the Empirical Literature 
Turning now from theoretical explanations of dividends to the empirical evidence, it 
seems fairly clear that some stylised facts have been established. First, despite the 
impeccable logic of the Miller and Modigliani position on the irrelevance of patterns 
of dividend distributions, dividend policy does seem to matter, to both investors and 
managers. Survey evidence from Lintner (1956) to Brav et al. (2005) and Dhanani 
(2005) demonstrate that in some senses managers seem to pursue active dividend 
policies. The considerable number of US survey studies (for example, Baker, Farrelly 
and Edelman, 1985; Baker and Powell, 1999; Baker, Veit and Powell, 2001) report 
consistently that managers have more regard to the change in dividend payouts, than 
levels and they tend to smooth the pattern of dividend growth. These surveys also 
report that managers generally attempt to increase dividends only when they think that 
increases in earnings are sustainable. Furthermore, managers think that decreases in 
the payout will cause an adverse price reaction. These results are broadly confirmed 
for the UK by the survey conducted by Dhanani (2005). 
Despite the dearth of systematic evidence on investors’ attitudes to dividends, it seems 
reasonable to assume that if managers are pursuing an active, but misinformed 
dividend policy aimed at pleasing shareholders, then the latter would be likely to 
communicate the lack of necessity to do so fairly readily (particularly institutional 
shareholders, perhaps). Certainly reports in the financial press of shareholder reaction 
to dividend cuts would seem to suggest strongly that investors regard dividends as an 
important ‘ritual’. 
The evidence from statistical studies of secondary data in large samples is rather less 
consistent than the survey evidence. For example, Redding (1995) found a positive 
link between firm size and dividend payouts and that informational factors, signalling, 
represented a strong influence on dividend policy – in line with the survey reports. In 
contrast the US work of Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) suggests that dividend 
increases did not provide reliable signals of future performance, but rather mapped 
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onto past earnings performance. If the signalling hypothesis is framed in terms of the 
dividend signal providing indications of future increases in earnings, rather than 
simply the sustainability of the current earnings level, then this evidence might be 
regarded as a negative finding.  
This negative result for the signalling hypothesis is also reported in the US study by 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996), although other statistical studies report in 
favour of the signalling role of dividends (Healy and Palepu, 1988; Aharony and 
Swary, 1980). However, unlike the rather mixed set of findings about the signalling 
impact of dividend increases, the empirical evidence about dividend cuts shows 
consistently that they lead to statistically significant negative stock price reactions 
(Healy and Palepu, 1988; Aharony and Swary, 1980). This result is obviously 
consistent with the views held by managers as reported in the survey evidence (for 
example, Lintner, 1956; Baker and Powell, 1999; Baker, Veit and Powell, 2001; Brav 
et al., 2003) and in the financial press (for example, Jenkins, 2002). A statistical 
empirical result that is also consistent with the survey evidence is the UK study by Ap 
Gwilym, Morgan and Thomas (2000), who find that dividend stability has a positive 
influence on stock returns. 
Inconsistency in the results generated by the empirical studies with quantitative 
archival data is also to be found in relation to the tax and clientele explanations of 
dividends, which posit that high tax bracket investors will gravitate towards stocks 
that do not pay or pay low levels of dividends, and vice versa. Elton and Gruber 
(1970) and Bajaj and Vijh (1990) offer evidence in support of such clientele effects, 
whereas Kalay and Michaely (2000) do not. 
There could, of course, be a number of reasons for the rather mixed set of results from 
the empirical literature based on statistical studies of the dividend puzzle. For 
example, changes in the regulatory climate, taxes regimes and macroeconomic 
environment might well effect the inclination of managers to pay dividends and the 
desire of investors to receive them. Therefore, it is possible that the reports of 
contradictory results based on samples in different calendar time simply reflect the 
impact of changes in the economic environment. If so, such studies would do little to 
corroborate or reject the mainstream hypotheses about dividends. Given that 
mainstream theoretical explanations typically do not allow for (say) variations due to 
the business cycle, it is not surprising that some empirical studies do not even attempt 
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to take account of such factors. However, if these factors do influence dividend 
decisions then their omission from models to be tested empirically would lead to 
variations in the results published over time. 
Furthermore statistical empirical studies typically use stock returns as a measure of 
the impact of dividend policy and assume one-way causation from dividends to 
returns – from the productive realm to the financial. However, during the bull market 
of the 1990s there was plenty of evidence that the performance of financial markets 
had an impact on the so-called real economy. The omission of dividends by many 
firms during this period and the (apparently) concomitant rise in the use of share re-
purchases, particularly in the US (Fama and French, 2001), might be evidence of  
two-way causation.  
Of course, such ideas are only speculative at this stage. Nevertheless, the evidence of 
shifts in distribution patterns from both the US and UK (Fama and French, 2001; 
Benito and Young, 2001; Ap Gwilym, Seaton and Thomas, 2004) suggest that this 
might be an appropriate time to survey firms in order to assess management attitudes 
to the distribution decision. In particular, the lack of survey evidence based on 
European firms2 means that this type of empirical research might provide a useful 
contribution to our understanding of the dividend puzzle as it applies outside the US.  
4. Research Methods  
Our survey was based on a survey methodology similar to that adopted in the US by 
Baker, Veit and Powell (2001) and Brav et al. (2005). The majority of the 
questionnaire was based on the Brav et al.  (2005) survey on corporate payout policy 
which incorporated share repurchasing as well as dividends. We amended their 
questionnaire to fit the European context and then re-worked the questions to focus on 
dividend policy. The questionnaire was piloted with academic colleagues at Kingston 
University. Their feedback was noted and the questionnaire revised in the light of 
comments. In an effort to encourage companies to respond, anonymity was 
guaranteed and a summary of the findings was offered to the respondents. The final 
version of the survey contained 24 questions and was 6 pages long. The survey 
                                          
2  For example, to the writers’ knowledge, the only published surveys in the UK was undertaken by the 
investment fund 3i  in 1993 and Dhanani (2005). 
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questionnaire was sent in 2003 to the finance directors of 312 UK companies listed on 
the London Stock Exchange. Subsequently it was sent in 2006 to the finance directors 
of the 48 Portuguese companies listed on the Euronext Exchange in Lisbon. The 
difference in timing arose because the Portuguese survey arose as a result of interest 
of in the earlier conference presentation of the UK results in 2004. 
Clearly the evidence from questionnaire surveys presents a number of difficulties. 
First, the respondents might not understand the questions and so the questionnaire 
might not elicit the responses sought by the researchers. Second, the respondents 
might not answer truthfully or lack appropriate incentives to search for information 
that is not readily to hand, thereby inducing the potential for a form of measurement 
error. Brav et al (2003) summarise this problem in the following way: they “measure 
beliefs and not necessarily actions” (2003:3). Third, like all researchers, we had to 
deal with the trade off between survey length and the likelihood of participants 
responding. In an ideal we would have liked to ask more questions, but in the event 
we erred on the side of brevity in the expectation of garnering more replies. 
A fourth, potential problem for questionnaires about dividend policy (and thus for our 
survey) was identified by Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985). This concerns the 
restrictive nature of only obtaining views from one director, (in this case finance 
directors), when it is likely that more than one person will decide on distribution 
policy. As Baker, Farrelly and Edelman, (1985: 83) point out, Chief Financial 
Officers are “not the only individuals involved in dividend policy decisions”.  
Another issue associated with questionnaire surveys is the problem of response bias. 
In an attempt to counter this problem we followed conventional practice and 
undertook follow-up mailings to non-respondents in order to “increase the response 
rate and reduce potential non-response bias” (Baker and Powell, 1999:23). The 
response rate for the UK for the study was 32.9 per cent and 60.4 per cent in Portugal, 
making an overall response rate of 36.6 per cent. This compares well with earlier 
studies as can be seen from Table 1. 
___________________________ 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
___________________________ 
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5. Data Sample 
The UK sample was drawn from the population of all listed, non-financial sector 
companies in the UK. The questionnaire was sent to a total of 312 firms in the 
summer of 2003 and 40 responses were received. Follow-up letters and the 
questionnaire were then sent to non-respondents and a further 63 responses were 
elicited in two tranches of 52 and 11. In total 103 usable replies were received. 
In the case of Portugal a letter and questionnaire were sent to the finance directors of 
all 48 firms listed on the Euronext Lisbon stock exchange. Nine responses were 
received from the initial mailing and a further 20 were received after the mailing of a 
follow-up letter and the questionnaire instrument. In all twenty-nine usable responses 
were received. 
The payout characteristics of the UK and Portuguese samples are shown in Table 2. 
___________________________ 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
___________________________ 
6. Survey Results 
In this section we report the results of our questionnaire survey to both UK and 
Portuguese firms and the results of our tests for similarities and differences between 
the two samples. 
 
6.1 Dividend Policy and Dividend Setting Process 
We asked a variety of questions about the firms’ dividend policy and the nature of the 
dividend setting process. This allows comparison with the results from Lintner’s 
(1956) survey in the US, where he found that firms set dividends on a conservative 
basis, with dividend payouts determined by sustainable earnings, and that firms used a 
 10
target payout ratio. The conservative nature of the dividend decision was clear from 
the extreme reluctance of mangers to cut dividend payouts. 
 
6.1.1 The UK Results on Dividend Policy and Decision Setting Process 
Table 3 presents the results for the UK sample. The conservative nature of the 
dividend decision can be seen throughout. Earnings are an important determinant of 
dividend payouts with around 83% of respondents reporting that the stability of future 
earnings (Question 3.3) and sustainable changes in earnings (Q3.2) being important or 
very important considerations. This reflected in the response to the statement about 
the influence of temporary changes (Q3.1) where 70% of respondents report that such 
changes are not important or not at all important. These results are all significant at 
the one percent level for both parametric and non-parametric tests. 
The conservative nature of dividend setting is also reflected in the 73% percent of 
respondents who consider that the historic pattern of dividends (Q3.12) is important or 
very important. The desire to maintain a smooth pattern of dividends is also clear, 
with 74% of respondents reporting (Q20.3) that this is an important or very important 
consideration. 
The reluctance of firms to cut dividends is evident from the responses, with 87% 
indicating that they try to avoid reducing dividends per share (Q20.4) and 62% 
reporting (Q20.10) that they are reluctant to make dividend changes that might have 
to be reduced in future. 
The current market price of a firm’s stock (Q3.17) does not appear to be an important 
consideration. To some extent at least, this seems to be consistent with only 41% of 
firms declaring that dividends are as important for stock valuation as it was 15-20 
years ago (Q4.6), although the mean response is significantly different from the 
neutral response at the one per cent level. 
___________________________ 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
___________________________ 
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The impact of cash reserves beyond a desired level (Q3.4) is not important or not at 
all important for only 44% of firms, although the mean response to this question, -
0.32, is statistically significant at the one per cent level. A large proportion of firms, 
70%, do not use dividend policy to influence their credit rating (Q4.7). 
Changes or growth in dividend per share is regarded as important or very important 
(Q20.2) by 79% of UK firms and this is consistent with the results to Q18 about 
targeting, reported in Table 4, with 88 respondents (86.27%) indicating that they 
target growth in dividend per share. This is by far the most important target, when 
compared to dividend yield and the payout ratio. The decline in the importance of the 
payout ratio compared to Lintner (1956) is consistent with the results of Brav et al. 
(2005) for the US. 
As far as targeting is concerned (Table 4), only 15 respondents (14.7%) consider their 
stated target as a strict goal, with 68% indicating that any target set is treated as a 
partially flexible or fully flexible goal in their decision making process. Interestingly, 
perhaps, this set of questions has the largest number of missing values (11) in the 
replies received. 
___________________________ 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
___________________________ 
6.1.2 The Portuguese Results on Dividend Policy and Decision Setting Process 
As in other countries, dividend policy and dividend setting are also dealt with in a 
conservative manner (see Table 5). Sustainable changes in earnings (Q3.2) and the 
stability of future earnings (Q3.3) are reported as important or very important by 69% 
and 83% respectively of Portuguese finance directors. The conservative nature of 
dividend decisions is confirmed with 76% of the Portuguese sample indicating that 
temporary changes in earnings are not important for dividend decisions, (Q3.1). All 
these results are statistically significant at the one per cent level for both parametric 
and non-parametric tests. 
 Sixty-six per cent consider the historic dividend pattern (Q3.12) to be important or 
very important, (significant at the one per cent level) but only 41% report that they 
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attempt to smooth the dividend stream from year to year (Q20.3). These results 
suggest a certain inconsistency in the Portuguese results, whereby historical dividend 
patterns are important or very important, but smoothing is not. 
 This inconsistency is also evident in respect of responses to our questions about 
dividend reductions. Fifty-five per cent of respondents agree or strongly agree that 
they try to avoid reducing dividends per share (Q20.4), but this finding is not 
statistically significant. Furthermore only 24 per cent agree or strongly agree with the 
statement that they would be reluctant to make dividend changes that might have to be 
reversed in future (Q20.10) as opposed to 45% who indicate that they would not be 
reluctant to do so. These results suggest certain ambivalence on the part of at least 
some Portuguese firms about some aspects of the dividend setting decision. 
___________________________ 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
___________________________ 
 
From the responses to our question about the influence of the current share price 
(Q3.17), it appears that this is not a major consideration for the majority of Portuguese 
firms. Indeed, only 10 per cent of firms consider that dividends are important or very 
important for stock valuation (Q4.6), with 45 per cent indicating that it is less 
important now than 15-20 years ago, and though not half of the firms surveyed, the 
result is statistically significant.  
A sizeable majority (66% significant at the one per cent level) of respondents indicate 
that dividends not used to influence credit rating (Q4.7), although this is not surprising 
given the undeveloped corporate bond market in Portugal. Cash balances above the 
desired holding also seem to have now obvious influence on dividend setting (Q3.4).  
For 55 per cent of respondents indicate that changes or growth in dividends per share 
are an important or very important consideration (Q20.2), but this finding is not 
statistically significant. This is consistent with the responses to the direct questions 
associated with targeting (Q18), reported in Table 4, where responses indicate that a 
variety of measures of dividend performance are considered when setting dividends. 
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The evidence in Table 4 also shows that Portuguese firms take a flexible approach to 
targets, with only one response indicating that strict dividend targets are set.  
6.1.3 UK versus Portuguese Responses on Dividend Policy and Dividend Setting 
Although the two surveys elicited similar responses to 7 of the questions dealt with in 
this section, there are important differences between the two sets of results. The 
results of difference tests for the two sets of responses are presented in Table 6. 
__________________________ 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
___________________________ 
 
The questions about the impact of temporary changes in earnings (Q3.1), sustainable 
changes in earnings (Q3.2), the stability of future earnings (Q3.3), and historic 
dividend policies produced very similar responses in the UK and Portugal, with no 
statistical differences in the two sets of responses. Similarly, there were no substantive 
differences in the responses about the influence of cash balances above desired 
holdings (Q3.4) or credit rating (Q4.7).  
In contrast the questions about dividend smoothing (Q20.3), reductions in dividends 
(Q20.4 and 20.10), past levels of the dividend payment (Q20.1), and the perceived 
importance of dividends on stock valuation (Q4.6) all produced statistically 
significant differences between the UK and Portuguese respondents, at the one per 
cent level. From this evidence it appears that UK finance directors are much more 
concerned about reductions in the dividend than their Portuguese counterparts. The 
UK responses are consistent with a long line of evidence from the US (from Lintner, 
1956; to Brav et al., 2005), whereas the Portuguese responses are clearly not. The 
perceived consequences of reductions in dividends are dealt with further in Section 
6.4, when we consider signalling. 
6.2 Clientele Considerations  
Overall the questions about clientele considerations do not elicit strong positive 
responses from either sample of respondents. For example, the tax positions of 
stockholders do not influence the dividend decisions of the majority of firms in both 
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countries (Q3.7 and Q20.8). In the UK 78 per cent of respondents consider the taxes 
on dividends as unimportant and in Portugal the figure is 59 per cent, both significant 
at the one per cent level.  
___________________________ 
 
TABLE 7 and 8 ABOUT HERE 
___________________________ 
 
 Despite the lack of positive responses to this set of questions, there were some 
statistically significant differences between the responses of the two samples (see 
Table 9). The influence of institutional investors (Q3.9) is much more apparent in the 
UK, with 47% of directors indicating that this was an important or very important 
consideration, whereas only 31% of Portuguese firms thought this important and 35% 
of them thought it unimportant or not at all important (12% in the UK sample) 
Consistent with this finding, 34 per cent of the Portuguese respondents considered the 
attraction of retail investors important or very important, whereas the figure in the UK 
is only 19 per cent. 
These results are broadly consistent with recent studies, and the lack of a tax impact 
on corporate decisions about dividends has already been recorded in US and UK 
studies (Brav et al., 2005; Dhanani, 2005). However, it is interesting to note that 
dividend taxes also do not figure in an economy with very different stock market 
characteristics such as Portugal. 
 6.3 Relationship between Investment Decisions and Dividend Decisions 
Responses to the survey questions about the relationship between investment and 
dividend decisions are also presented in Tables 7 and 8. The availability of good 
investment opportunities (Q3.8) has some influence on UK respondents with 41 per 
cent (significant at the 5 per cent level) rating this factor as important or very 
important for the dividend decision. The statement in Q4.1 seeks responses about the 
priority of the investment decision over the dividend decision; 32 per cent of UK 
respondents agree or strongly agree that investment is the priority, but this does not 
represent a statistically significant result. Despite the possible influence that 
investment opportunities might have on the dividend decision, 63 per cent (significant 
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at the one per cent level) agree or strongly agree that their firms would raise new 
funds to undertake the investment, rather than reduce the dividend (Q4.5).  
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), it would be in shareholders’ interests if a 
firm were to forego or reduce the dividend payment in order to undertake profitable 
investment projects. In this view, persisting with a dividend payment and raising 
external capital in order to do so, especially in the light of transaction costs, could be 
considered economically irrational. This is addressed by Q3.11 and the UK responses 
make it clear that the existence of flotation costs would not inhibit raising new funds 
in order to maintain the dividend. 
The influence of available investment opportunities on the dividend decision is much 
stronger in Portugal with 72 per cent acknowledging that influence (Q3.8). In a 
similar vein, 52 per cent of responses to Q4.1 (significant at the 5 per cent level) agree 
that the investment decision is prior to the dividend decision, with only 14 per cent 
rejecting that priority. The greater importance of investment opportunities in Portugal 
is consistent with the responses to Q4.5, with only 38 per cent agreeing that new funds 
would be raised to avoid cutting the dividend in order to undertake more investment, 
although a 59 per cent response to Q3.11 suggests that flotation costs would not 
inhibit the raising of external funds. 
These differences between the UK and Portuguese responses to questions about the 
influence of investment opportunities on dividend decisions receives support from the 
statistical difference tests reported in Panel B of Table 9. 
___________________________ 
 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
___________________________ 
6.4 Signalling and Agency Explanations  
The survey results associated with questions about signalling and agency are 
presented in Tables 10, 11, and 12. Although many of the questions already dealt with 
above might be construed to have implicit inferences for the signalling and agency 
hypotheses, the questions dealt with in this section addressed these issues directly. 
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 First we examine the extent to which the finance directors surveyed think that 
dividends convey signals to investors. Then we consider specific issues associated 
with the signalling literature and finally agency issues. 
___________________________ 
 
TABLES 10, 11, 12 ABOUT HERE 
___________________________ 
 
It is clear from our survey that UK finance directors are more convinced that 
dividends convey information to investors. In answer to Q4.2, 77 per cent  of UK 
directors indicated strong or very strong agreement with that idea, with only 2 per cent  
registering disagreement. In contrast only 24 per cent of Portuguese respondents agree 
that dividend convey information and 31 per cent actually disagree. Not surprisingly 
there is a statistically significant difference between these two sets of responses at the 
one per cent level.  
This result is echoed even more strongly with the responses to Q4.4, which posed the 
statement that there are negative consequences to dividend reductions. In the UK 
sample 87% of respondents (the largest weighting in the entire survey) registered 
strong or very strong agreement with the statement. In contrast only 45 per cent of 
Portuguese respondents agreed with the statement. Again there is a highly significant 
difference between to two sets of responses as reported in Table 12. 
This result is confirmed by the responses to Q20.6, which presented the proposition 
that the cost of raising capital is lower than the costs associated with cutting 
dividends. Around a third of UK directors agreed with this and just over a third (38%) 
disagreed. In the Portuguese sample only 3% agreed, whilst 62% disagreed. Again the 
difference between the two groups, reported in Table 12, is significant at the one per 
cent level. While the approximately uniform distribution of UK responses is 
ambiguous, the Portuguese responses suggest that finance directors there are not 
persuaded that dividend reductions necessarily send negative signals to investors. 
In relation to negative signals, Easterbrook (1984) suggests that in some 
circumstances dividend payments might be construed as an indictor of a shortage of 
profitable investment projects. This idea was posed directly in Q3.13 of the survey. In 
the UK 77 per cent  of finance directors disagreed of strongly disagreed with this 
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against 52 per cent in the Portuguese sample, a difference that was significant at the 
five per cent level (Table 12).  
All this suggests that UK firms regard dividends as much more likely to convey a 
positive signal than their Portuguese counterparts. However, UK respondents were 
less convinced of the power of dividends to signal in a positive manner in terms of 
risk reduction. Q4.2 suggest that dividends make a company’s stock less risky as 
against retentions (a sort of bird-in –the-hand hypothesis), but 40% of UK directors 
indicated that they disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement, little different 
from Portuguese firms (28%). 
In setting dividends both Portuguese and UK respondents seem to have little regard to 
the dividend policies of competitors’ (Q3.5) with 52% of the former and 43% of the 
latter indicating that competitor policies were unimportant or not at all important. 
Furthermore neither group uses their own dividend policies as a competitive device as 
the almost identical responses to Q4.8 demonstrate. 
Bhattacharya (1979) emphasises the idea that to be credible signals have to be costly 
and he suggests that firms might use dividends to signal quality, whereby dividends 
increase the risk of having to raise external finance and that poor performance would 
be more likely for low quality firms. This proposition is tested directly by Q20.7 with 
53 per cent  of UK and 76 per cent of Portuguese respondents disagreeing or strongly 
disagreeing with it. The difference between the two groups in their strength of 
disagreement with the Bhattacharya hypothesis is significant at the five per cent level, 
but it is difficult to draw an inference other than it is strongly rejected by both sets of 
respondents.  A slightly different approach to the signalling of quality is provided by 
Miller and Rock (1985) who suggest that only stronger firms will be able to give up 
profitable investments in order to maintain or increase the dividend. This hypothesis 
was tested directly with Q4.9 and rejected resoundingly, by 80 per cent of UK and 62 
per cent of Portuguese respondents.  
The responses to the questions and statements about signalling show clearly that the 
UK finance directors are more convinced than their Portuguese counterparts that 
dividends convey value-relevant information to investors. Furthermore, they are also 
more convinced that dividend cuts are likely to be costly. The UK directors have clear 
view that negative signals about dividends are important, whereas the Portuguese are 
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simply more sceptical of the power of signalling with dividends. The more 
sophisticated signalling models such as those proposed by Bhattacharya and by Miller 
and Rock, which offer the possibility of firms being able to send positive signals to 
the market via dividend policy, are rejected by both groups. The finding against the 
sophisticated academic models of signalling is consistent with the recent findings in 
the US by Brav et al. (2005). 
Turning now to agency theory and dividends, we only asked two direct questions in 
this regard, (although, as noted above, other responses might be thought to convey 
inferences about an agency hypothesis of dividends). Q3.16 suggested that dividends 
were used to attract institutional investors because of their more exacting monitoring 
function. This was rejected by 44 per cent and accepted by only 19 per cent of the UK 
sample Table 10). In contrast, and perhaps counter to intuition, the balance of 
responses was reversed in the Portuguese sample with 35 per cent in agreement or 
strong agreement and only 21 per cent rejecting this proposition (Table 11). The 
difference between the samples is significant at the one per cent level (Table 12), 
suggesting that there is weak support (weak because fewer than 50% of respondents 
supported the statement) for this agency perspective in Portugal, but none in the UK. 
Question 3.6 proposes that dividends reduce cash balances and thereby encourage 
efficient decision making (in line with the Jensen, 1986 free cash flow hypothesis). 
Approximately 71 per cent of the UK sample and 52 per cent of the Portuguese 
sample disagreed or strongly disagreed with this proposition, with no statistical 
difference (Tables 10, 11, and 12).  
The evidence from questions 3.6 and 3.16 provide almost no support for the agency 
hypothesis of dividends. However, while the responses to Q3.6 do not provide support 
for the agency hypothesis, this is not necessarily evidence against it, if ordinary 
dividends are not used to ‘disgorge’ surplus cash to shareholders (firms might rely 
special dividends or share re-purchases for that purpose, in order to avoid mixed 
signal effects). 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This comparative survey study has uncovered a considerable number of similarities in 
the ways in which UK and Portuguese finance directors consider policy and decision 
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making with respect to dividend distributions. However, the study has also found 
some interesting differences between the two groups. 
The conservative nature of dividend policies that has been reported in studies since 
Lintner (1956) is broadly confirmed by both Portuguese and UK respondents to our 
questionnaire (though more strongly in the UK). Temporary changes in earnings have 
little impact on the dividend decisions of either group, whereas the historic dividend 
policy, the stability and the sustainability of future earnings are all important factors 
for the dividend decision – although sustainability of future earnings is marginally 
more important in the UK.  
Both groups also focus on dividend changes and growth, rather than levels, although 
to a significantly greater extent in the UK than in Portugal. This UK focus on changes 
is consistent with the much greater importance attached to recent dividend payments 
and also to dividend smoothing in the UK. The greater conservatism exhibited by the 
UK responses is also demonstrated by the greater reluctance to cut the dividend or to 
make dividend increases that might have to be reduced in future. All these differences 
between the samples are significant at the one per cent level. 
Although both groups approach dividend policy conservatively, it appears that 
decision making in respect of dividends in any one year varies considerably. UK firms 
are keen to maintain a smooth dividend stream and are reluctant to cut the dividend, 
whereas Portuguese firms do not consider these characteristics of their dividend 
decision making to be very important. This difference might be explained by the 
responses to the questions about dividend and investment, reported in Tables 7 
through 9. For Portuguese firms the availability of good investment opportunities 
(Q3.8) is a much more consideration than for UK firms and the difference in 
responses is highly significant. In relation to the priority of investment and dividend 
decisions, over 50 per cent of Portuguese firms agree or strongly agree that the former 
is taken prior to the latter, whereas the corresponding UK response is only 32 per cent 
and the difference is statistically significant, though only at the 9 per cent level (Table 
9). As reported above, UK firms are much more reluctant to reduce the dividend and 
so we find that a much higher proportion of UK firms would rather raise new finance 
to undertake investment than reduce the dividend (63% versus 38%) and the 
difference with Portuguese firms is highly significant. Thus it would appear that 
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Portuguese firms are prepared to temper their dividend decisions in the light of 
investment opportunities, in a way that UK firms are not. 
When we consider clientele issues, there appear to be more similarities than 
differences between the two groups of respondents. Both seem to largely ignore the 
taxes on dividends paid by their shareholders. Whilst 5 of the set of 6 questions or 
statements on clientele issues reveal statistically significant differences between the 
two samples, for the most part the significance is driven by the relative strength of 
response, rather than opposite views. However, it does appear that UK respondents 
pay more attention to institutional investors whilst the Portuguese are more aware of 
retail investors, though the differences are not great. 
With regard to the signalling hypothesis of dividends, then UK respondents indicate 
strongly that dividends convey information to investors, as opposed a minority of  
Portuguese respondents (24%). Furthermore, this difference on signalling between the 
groups is reinforced when the statement on the negative consequences of dividend 
reductions is posed: the UK sample produces the strongest of any response in either 
sample in support of this, whereas less than half the Portuguese agree or strongly 
agree. Furthermore, when asked if the cost of raising new capital is lower than the 
cost of cutting the dividend, 62 per cent of Portuguese respondents reject this, as 
against only 38 per cent of the UK sample. Again the difference is highly significant. 
Although the differences recorded in relation to other questions or statements about 
signalling are less clear cut, the divergence of opinion in relation to these three 
suggests a major divergence on the issue of signalling and dividends.  
Finally, the responses to the direct questions or statements about agency theory and 
dividends do not offer any real support for that hypothesis, a finding consistent with a 
number of previous US and UK studies (Brav et al., 2005; Dhanani, 2005). 
Although we have recorded a number of similarities in the opinions of UK and 
Portuguese finance directors, in relation to dividend policy and decision making, our 
surveys have also uncovered some important differences. These differences might, 
perhaps, be accounted for by the different characteristics of the UK and Portuguese 
capital markets and economies, although this is, of course, speculation. However, 
what is clear from our results is that it would be difficult to utilise a universal model 
of dividends to explain the survey evidence that we have generated and reported here.  
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Table 1 Comparison of Dividend Survey Response Rates 
 
Authors  Response Rate % 
 
 
Baker, Farrelly & Edelman (1985) 56.6 
Farrelly & Baker (1989) 25.8 
Baker & Powell (1999) 32.9 
Baker, Veit & Powell (2001) 29.8 
Brav, Graham, Harvey & Michaely (2005) 16.0 
Dhanani (2005) 16.4 
 
The Current study 36.61  
 
1 UK response rate = 32.9%; Portuguese Response Rate = 60.4% 
 
 
Table 2 Panel A   Sample Characteristics – Payout Policies  
 
 
 UK Sample Portuguese Sample 
Payout Characteristic n % n % 
 
 
During the past three years, the company has 
 
Both paid dividends and repurchased shares 32 (31.1) 4 (13.8) 
Only repurchased shares 2 (1.9) 1 (3.4) 
Only paid dividends 61 (59.2) 14 (48.3) 
Neither paid dividends nor repurchased shares 7 (6.8) 10 (34.5) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Panel B  Sample Characteristics – Payout Policies 
 
 
 UK Sample Portuguese Sample 
Payout Characteristic n % n % 
 
Of funds that could be used for dividends, the most likely alternative use would be to:1 
 
Retain as cash 18 (17.5) 14 (48.3) 
Invest more 47 (45.6) 16 (55.2) 
Mergers/acquisitions 37 (35.9) 7 (24.1) 
Repurchase shares 27 (26.2) 1 (3.4) 
Repay debt 50 (48.5) 17 (58.6) 
Other 2 (1.9) 3 (10.3) 
 
1  Multiple responses possible 
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Table 3 Survey Responses by UK Firms Related to Dividend Policy and Dividend Setting, Registering Agreement or Disagreement to the 
Questions or Statements Measured on a Scale +2 (strongly agree/very important) to -2 (strongly disagree/not at all important)  
 
       
Survey Question  N %+ %- Mean t-value p-value K-S ‘z’ p-value 
 
 
3.1 A temporary change in earnings 101 7.9 70.3 -0.83 -9.456 0.000 2.799 0.000  
3.2 A sustainable change in earnings 103 83.5 3.9 1.12 12.908 0.000 2.864 0.000 
3.3 Stability of future earnings 103 82.5 3.9 1.10 13.735 0.000 2.817 0.000 
3.4 Having extra cash relative to our desired cash holding 101 25.8 43.6 -0.32 -2.838 0.005 1.764 0.004 
3.12 Maintaining consistency with historic dividend policy 102 72.5 4.9 0.84 10.740 0.000 3.069 0.000 
3.17 Market price of our stock  101 28.7 29.7 -0.05 -0.547 0.586 2.258  0.000 
4.6 Dividends are as important for stock valuation as 15-20 100 41.0 22.0 0.24 2.700 0.008 2.137 0.000 
 years ago 
4.7 Dividend policy is used as a tool to influence credit rating 102 6.9 69.6 -0.94 -10.445 0.000 2.241 0.000 
20.1 The company considers the level of dividends paid 98 64.2 10.2 0.676.863 0.000 2.717 0.000 
 in recent years 
20.2 We consider the change or growth in dividends  100 79.0 3.0 1.0212.311 0.000 2.804 0.000 
 per share 
20.3 We try to maintain a smooth dividend stream  99 73.7 8.1 0.9010.365 0.000 2.825 0.000 
 from year-to-year 
20.4 We try to avoid reducing dividends per share 100 87.0 6.0 1.3015.351 0.000 2.858 0.000 
20.10 We are reluctant to make dividend changes that  99 61.6 14.1 0.646.240 0.000 2.548 0.000 
 might be reversed in future 
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Table 4 Survey Responses about Targetting1 
_____________________________________________________________________   
 
 UK Sample Portuguese Sample 
Survey question Yes % Yes % 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
When you make you dividend decisions, do you target?1 
 
Level of dividends per share 37 (35.9) 13 (44.8) 
Growth in dividends per share 77 (74.8) 10 (34.5) 
Dividend yield 28 (27.2) 12 (41.4) 
Dividends as a percentage of earnings 44 (42.7) 16 (55.2) 
Do not target at all 3 (2.9) 4 (13.8) 
 
Is the target framed as? 
 
A strict goal 15 (14.6) 1 (3.4) 
A partially flexible goal 34 (33.0) 8 (27.6) 
A flexible goal 35 (34.0) 15 (51.7) 
Not really a goal 8 (6.8) 5 (17.2) 
 
Number of responses 92 (88.3) 29  (100.0) 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
1  Multiple responses possible 
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Table 5 Survey Responses by Portuguese Firms Related to Dividend Policy and Dividend Setting, Registering Agreement or 
Disagreement to the Questions or Statements Measured on a Scale +2 (strongly agree/very important) to -2 (strongly disagree/not at all 
important)  
 
       
Survey Question N %+ %- Mean t-value p-value K-S ‘z’ p-value 
 
 
3.1 A temporary change in earnings 29 10.3 75.9 -0.97 -5.506 0.000 2.290 0.000 
3.2 A sustainable change in earnings 29 68.9 10.3 0.76 3.746 0.001 2.368 0.000  
3.3 Stability of future earnings 29 82.7 3.4 1.10 7.697 0.000 2.662 0.000 
3.4 Having extra cash relative to our desired cash holding 29 34.4 34.5 -0.17 -0.775 0.445 1.161 0.135 
3.12 Maintaining consistency with historic dividend policy 29 65.5 20.7 0.76 3.143 0.004 2.182 0.000 
3.17 Market price of our stock  29 34.5 20.7 0.07 0.422 0.677 2.476 0.000 
4.6 Dividends are as important for stock valuation as 15-20 years ago  29 10.3 44.8 -0.59-3.213 0.003 1.300 0.022 
4.7 Dividend policy is used as a tool to influence credit rating 29 6.9 65.5 -0.93-5.217 0.000 1.857 0.002 
20.1 The company considers the level of dividends paid  29 20.7 58.6 -0.62-2.642 0.013 1.811 0.003  in 
recent years 
20.2 We consider the change or growth in dividends  29 55.2 24.1 0.241.097 0.282 1.625 0.010  per 
share 
20.3 We try to maintain a smooth dividend stream  29 41.4 27.6 0.100.431 0.669 1.207 0.109 
 from year-to-year 
20.4 We try to avoid reducing dividends per share 29 55.1 27.6 0.241.045 0.305 1.625 0.010 
20.10 We are reluctant to make dividend changes that  29 24.1 44.8 -0.21-0.972 0.339 1.393 0.041 
 might be reversed in future 
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Table 6 Comparison of Survey Responses by UK and Portuguese Firms Related to Dividend Policy and Dividend Setting, Registering 
Agreement or Disagreement to the Questions or Statements Measured on a Scale +2 (strongly agree/very important) to -2 (strongly disagree/not 
at all important)  
 
 
 Difference K-S M-W  
Survey Question  in Means t-value p-value ‘z’ p-value ‘z’ p-value 
 
 
3.1 A temporary change in earnings 0.113 0.585z 0.559 0.403 0.997 -0.766 0.444 
3.2 A sustainable change in earnings 0.358 1.835z 0.069 0.691 0.726 -1.683 0.092 
3.3 Stability of future earnings -0.006 -0.038z 0.970 0.048 1.000 -0.051 0.959 
3.4 Having extra cash relative to our desired cash holding -0.144 -0.602z 0.548 0.431 0.992 -0.704 0.481 
3.12 Maintaining consistency with historic dividend policy 0.085 0.433z 0.665 0.964 0.311 -0.424 0.672 
3.17 Market price of our stock  -0.118 -0.622z 0.535 0.428 0.993 -0.779 0.436 
4.6 Dividends are as important for stock valuation as 15-20 years ago  0.826 4.303z 0.000 1.453 0.029 -3.682 0.000 
4.7 Firm uses dividend policy as one tool to influence credit rating -0.010 -0.052z 0.958 0.1994 1.000 -0.032 0.974 
20.1 The company considers the level of dividends paid  1.294 5.082x 0.000 2.290 0.000 -4.800 0.000 
 in recent years 
20.2 We consider the change or growth in dividends per share 0.779 3.312x 0.000 1.130 0.156 -3.320 0.001 
20.3 We try to maintain a smooth dividend stream from year-to-year 0.796 3.120x 0.000 1.532 0.018 -3.126 0.002 
20.4 We try to avoid reducing dividends per share 1.059 4.304x 0.000 1.833 0.002 -4.521 0.000 
20.10 We are reluctant to make dividend changes that  0.843 3.821z 0.000 1.775 0.004 -3.592 0.000 
 might be reversed in future 
 
Notes:    K-S = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 2 independent samples 
M-W = Mann-Whitney test 
X, Z = unequal and equal sample variances determined by Levene’s test 
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Table 7 Survey Responses by UK Firms Related to Clientele Considerations and the Relationship between Dividend and Investment 
Decisions Registering Agreement or Disagreement to the Questions or Statements Measured on a Scale +2 (strongly agree/very important) to -2 
(strongly disagree/not at all important)  
 
       
Survey Question  N %+ %- Mean t-value p-value K-S ‘z’ p-value 
 
 
Panel A: Clientele Considerations 
 
3.7 Personal taxes stockholders pay when receiving dividend 102 3.9 77.5 -1.12 -13.315 0.000 2.357 0.000 
3.9 The influence of institutional shareholders 103 46.6 11.7 0.41 4.537 0.000 2.141 0.000 
3.14 Attracting retail investors to purchase our stock 102 18.7 54.9 -0.51 -5.038 0.000 2.356 0.000 
3.15 Attracting institutional investors to purchase our stock 102 48.0 23.5 0.25 2.321 0.022 2.433 0.000 
20.5 We pay dividends to attract investors subject to  96 29.1 35.4 -0.08-0.862 0.391 1.837 0.002 
 ‘prudent man’ investment restrictions 
20.8 We pay dividends to demonstrate value despite  95 14.8 61.1 -0.69-6.627 0.000 2.222 0.000 
 dividend taxes  
 
Panel B: Dividend Decisions in Relation to Investment Decisions 
 
3.8 The availability of good investment opportunities 102 41.2 22.5 0.24 2.338 0.021 1.877 0.002 
3.10 Merger and acquisition strategy 101 34.6 39.6 -0.13 -1.120 0.286 1.833 0.002 
3.11 Flotation costs to issuing additional equity 99 4.0 77.8 -1.18 -13.466 0.000 2.687 0.000 
4.1 Dividend decisions are made after investment plans are determined 102 32.3 30.4 0.09 0.886 0.378 2.135 0.000 
4.5 Rather than reducing dividends, the company would raise new  102 62.7 16.7 0.56 5.755 0.000 3.040 0.000  
 funds to undertake investment 
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Table 8 Survey Responses by Portuguese Firms Related to Clientele Considerations and the Relationship between the Dividend and the 
Investment Decisions, Registering Agreement or Disagreement to the Questions or Statements Measured on a Scale +2 (strongly agree/very 
important) to -2 (strongly disagree/not at all important)  
 
       
Survey Question N %+ %- Mean t-value p-value K-S ‘z’ p-value 
 
 
Panel A: Clientele Considerations 
 
3.7 Personal taxes stockholders pay when receiving dividend 29 10.3 58.6 -0.522 -3.266 0.000 1.424 0.035 
3.9 The influence of institutional shareholders 29 31.0 34.5 -0.103 -0.487 0.630 1.021 0.248 
3.14 Attracting retail investors to purchase our stock 29 34.4 24.1 0.069 0.386 0.702 1.393 0.041 
3.15 Attracting institutional investors to purchase our stock 29 37.9 24.1 0.138 0.812 0.424 1.393 0.041 
20.5 We pay dividends to attract investors subject to  29 3.4 58.6 -0.759 -4.919 0.000 1.609 0.011 
 ‘prudent man’ investment restrictions 
20.8 We pay dividends to demonstrate value despite  29 3.4 79.3 -1.000 -7.124 0.000 2.476 0.000 
 dividend taxes  
 
Panel B: Dividend Decisions in Relation to Investment Decisions 
 
3.8 The availability of good investment opportunities 29 72.4 0.0 1.000 7.124 0.000 1.486 0.024 
3.10 Merger and acquisition strategy 29 58.6 24.1 0.310 1.361 0.184 1.811 0.003 
3.11 Flotation costs to issuing additional equity 29 6.8 58.6 -0.655 -3.768 0.001 2.321 0.000 
4.1 Dividend decisions are made after investment plans are determined 29 51.7 13.8 0.448 2.546 0.017 1.950 0.001 
4.5 Rather than reducing dividends, the company would raise new  29 37.9 31.0 -0.069 -0.319 0.752 1.161 0.135 
 funds to undertake investment 
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Table 9 Comparison of Survey Responses by UK and Portuguese Firms Related to Clientele Considerations and the Relationship between 
the Dividend and the Investment Decisions, Registering Agreement or Disagreement to the Questions or Statements Measured on a Scale +2 
(strongly agree/very important) to -2 (strongly disagree/not at all important)  
 
 
 Difference K-S M-W  
Survey Question  in Means t-value p-value ‘z’ p-value ‘z’ p-value 
 
 
Panel A: Clientele Considerations 
 
3.7 Personal taxes stockholders pay when receiving dividend -0.566 -3.121z 0.002 1.325 0.060 -2.966 0.003 
3.9 The influence of institutional shareholders 0.511 2.515z 0.013 1.086 0.189 -2.259 0.024 
3.14 Attracting retail investors to purchase our stock -0.579 -2.725z 0.007 1.462 0.028 -2.761 0.006 
3.15 Attracting institutional investors to purchase our stock 0.107 0.492z 0.624 0.480 0.975 -0.713 0.476 
20.8 We pay dividends to demonstrate value despite dividend taxes  0.305 1.742x 0.086 0.861 0.449 -1.329 0.184 
20.5 We pay dividends to attract investors subject to  0.675 3.455z 0.001 1.214 0.105 -3.193 0.001 
 ‘prudent man’ investment restrictions 
 
Panel B: Dividend Decisions in Relation to Investment Decisions 
 
3.8 The availability of good investment opportunities -0.765 -4.427x 0.000 1.484 0.024 -3.578 0.000 
3.10 Merger and acquisition strategy -0.439 -1.780z 0.078 1.138 0.150 -1.910 0.056 
3.11 Flotation costs to issuing additional equity -0.527 -2.810z 0.006 1.288 0.072 -2.754 0.006 
4.1 Dividend decisions are made after investment plans are determined -0.360 -1.722z 0.088 0.920 0.365 -1.913 0.056 
4.5 Rather than reducing dividends, the company would raise new  0.628 2.916z 0.004 1.179 0.124 -2.675 0.007 
 funds to undertake investment 
 
 
Notes:    K-S = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 2 independent samples 
M-W = Mann-Whitney test 
X, Z = unequal and equal sample variances determined by Levene’s test 
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Table 10 Survey Responses by UK Firms Related to Signalling and Agency Theories of Dividend Policy Registering Agreement or 
Disagreement to the Questions or Statements Measured on a Scale +2 (strongly agree/very important) to -2 (strongly disagree/not at all 
important)  
 
       
Survey Question  N %+ %- Mean t-value p-value K-S ‘z’ p-value 
 
 
Panel A: Signalling  
 
3.5 Dividend policies of competitors in our industry 102 22.6 43.1 -0.36 -3.550 0.001 2.081 0.000 
3.13 Dividends might indicate shortage of profitable investments 102 3.9 76.5 -1.00 -12.687 0.000 2.673 0.000 
4.2 Dividend decisions convey information about the company to 102 76.5 2.0 0.85 12.935 0.000 3.556 0.000 
 investors 
4.3 Dividends make stock less risky (versus retained earnings) 100 16.0 40.0 -0.30 -3.542 0.001 2.384 0.000 
4.4 There are negative consequences to dividend reductions 102 87.3 12.7 1.19 15.358 0.000 2.810 0.000 
4.8 Dividend policy used make firm look better than competitors 102 7.8 69.6 -0.99 -10.422 0.000 2.285 0.000 
4.9 Dividend used to show that firm could bear cost of 100 2.0 80.0 -1.27 -15.357 0.000 3.013 0.000 
 external financing or passing up  
20.6 The cost of raising capital is lower than the cost of  96 32.3 37.5 -0.07-0.605 0.547 1.556 0.016 
 cutting dividends 
20.7 We pay dividends to demonstrate strength to raise  97 13.4 52.6 -0.58-5.637 0.000 1.878 0.002 
 capital if needed 
20.9 We pay dividends to show that the firm is strong  97 9.3 75.3 -1.02-9.951 0.000 2.407 0.000 
 enough can pass up profitable investments 
 
Panel B: Agency 
 
3.6 To reduce cash thereby encouraging efficient decision making 102 9.8 70.6 -0.90 -9.392 0.000 2.486 0.000 
3.16 Attracting institutional investors because of monitoring function 100 19.0 44.0 -0.40 -3.903 0.000 2.118 0.000 
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Table 11 Survey Responses by Portuguese Firms Related to Signalling and Agency Theories of Dividend Policy Registering Agreement or 
Disagreement to the Questions or Statements Measured on a Scale +2 (strongly agree/very important) to -2 (strongly disagree/not at all 
important)  
 
       
Survey Question N %+ %- Mean t-value p-value K-S ‘z’ p-value 
 
 
Panel A: Signalling 
 
3.5 Dividend policies of competitors in our industry 29 20.7 51.7 -0.586 -2.822 0.009 1.486 0.024 
3.13 Dividends might indicate shortage of profitable investments 29 13.8 51.7 -0.552 -3.134 0.004 1.052 0.218 
4.2 Dividend decisions convey information about the company to  29 24.1 31.0 -0.069 -0.420 0.677 1.393 0.041 
 investors 
4.3 Dividends make stock less risky (versus retained earnings) 29 20.7 27.6 -0.241 -1.316 0.199 2.105 0.000 
4.4 There are negative consequences to dividend reductions 29 44.8 17.2 0.310 1.609 0.119 1.764 0.004 
4.8 Dividend policy used make firm look better than competitors 29 6.9 69.0 -1.000 -5.588 0.000 2.043 0.000 
4.9 Dividend used to show that firm could bear cost of external 29 13.8 62.1 -0.879 -4.338 0.000 2.228 0.000 
 financing or passing up investment  
20.6 The cost of raising capital is lower than the cost of  29 3.4 62.1 -0.897 -5.363 0.000 1.671 0.007 
 cutting dividends 
20.7 We pay dividends to demonstrate strength to raise  29 6.9 75.9 -1.000 -6.075 0.000 2.290 0.000 
 capital if needed 
20.9 We pay dividends to show that the firm is strong  29 6.9 69.0 -0.897 -5.363 0.000 1.919 0.001 
 enough can pass up profitable investments 
 
Panel B: Agency 
 
3.6 To reduce cash thereby encouraging efficient decision making 29 6.9 51.7 -0.655 -3.931 0.001 1.424 0.035 
3.16 Attracting institutional investors because of monitoring function 29 34.5 20.7 0.172 1.000 0.326 1.578 0.014 
 
 
 33
Table 12 Comparison of Survey Responses by UK and Portuguese Firms Related to Signalling and Agency Theories of Dividend Policy 
Registering Agreement or Disagreement to the Questions or Statements Measured on a Scale +2 (strongly agree/very important) to -2 (strongly 
disagree/not at all important)  
 
 
 Difference K-S M-W  
Survey Question  in Means t-value p-value ‘z’ p-value ‘z’ p-value 
 
 
Panel A: Signalling 
 
3.5 Dividend policies of competitors in our industry 0.223 1.010 0.314 0.519 0.951 -0.951 0.342 
3.13 Dividends might indicate shortage of profitable investments -0.448 -2.324 0.025 1.176 0.126 -2.376 0.018 
4.2 Dividend decisions convey information about the company to investors0.922 5.213 0.000 2.487 0.000 -5.282 0.000 
4.3 Dividends make stock less risky (versus retained earnings) -0.059 -0.316 0.753 0.589 0.879 -0.705 0.481 
4.4 There are negative consequences to dividend reductions 0.876 4.216 0.000 2.016 0.001 -4.370 0.000 
4.8 Dividend policy used make firm look better than competitors 0.010 0.049 0.961 0.045 1.000 -0.035 0.972 
4.9 Dividend used to show that firm could bear cost of external financing-0.373 -1.677 0.102 0.850 0.465 -1.518 0.129 
 or passing up investment    
20.6 The cost of raising capital is lower than the cost of cutting 0.824 3.461 0.001 1.361 0.049 -3.266 0.001 
  dividends 
20.7 We pay dividends to demonstrate strength to raise capital if needed 0.423 2.180 0.034 1.100 0.178 -2.049 0.040 
20.9 We pay dividends to show that the firm is strong  -0.124 -0.594 0.553 0.499 0.965 -0.907 0.364 
 enough can pass up profitable investments 
 
Panel B: Agency 
 
3.6 To reduce cash thereby encouraging efficient decision making -0.247 -1.228 0.222 0.896 0.398 -1.482 0.138 
3.16 Attracting institutional investors because of monitoring function -0.598 -2.766 0.007 1.133 0.154 -2.638 0.008 
 
Notes:    K-S = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 2 independent samples 
M-W = Mann-Whitney test 
X, Z = unequal and equal sample variances determined by Levene’s test 
 34
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13 Survey Responses about Dividend Initiation  
_____________________________________________________________________
   
 UK Sample Portuguese Sample 
Survey question Yes % Yes % 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
If you were deciding to make a distribution for the very first time, would your first 
payout be? 
 
Dividends only 65 (63.1) 27 (93.1) 
Share repurchase only 10 ( 9.7) 0 ( 0.0) 
Combination of dividends & repurchases 20 (19.4) 1 (3.4) 
 
Number of responses 95 (92.2) 28 (96.6) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
